

# In The Senate of the United States

Sitting as a Court of Impeachment

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IN RE: IMPEACHMENT OF G. THOMAS PORTEOUS, JR.,  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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## AMENDED REPLICATION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ANSWER OF G. THOMAS PORTEOUS, JR., TO THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT

The House of Representatives, through its Managers and counsel, respectfully replies to the Answer to Articles of Impeachment as follows:

### RESPONSE TO THE PREAMBLE

Judge Porteous in his Answer to the Articles of Impeachment, denies certain of the allegations and makes what are primarily technical arguments as to the charging language that do not address the factual substance of the allegations. However, it is in Judge Porteous's Preamble that he sets forth his real defense and, without denying he committed the conduct that is alleged in the Articles of Impeachment, insists that nevertheless he should not be removed from Office.

At several points in his Preamble, Judge Porteous notes that he was not criminally prosecuted by the Department of Justice, the implication being that the House and the Senate should abdicate their Constitutionally assigned roles of deciding whether the conduct of a Federal judge rises to the level of a high crime or misdemeanor and warrants the Judge's removal, and should instead defer to the Department of Justice on this issue. Judge Porteous maintains that impeachment and removal may only proceed upon conduct that resulted in a criminal

prosecution, no matter how corrupt the conduct at issue, or what reasons explain the Department's decision not to prosecute. Judge Porteous provides no support for this contention because there is none – that is not what the Constitution provides.

Indeed, the Senate has by its prior actions made it clear that the decision as to whether a Judge's conduct warrants his removal from Office is the Constitutional prerogative of the Senate – not the Department of Justice – and the existence of a successful (or even an unsuccessful) criminal prosecution is irrelevant to the Senate's decision. The Senate has convicted and removed a Federal judge who was acquitted at a criminal trial (Judge Alcee Hastings). The Senate has also convicted a Federal judge for personal financial misconduct (Judge Harry Claiborne) while at the same time acquitting that same Judge of the Article that was based specifically on the fact of his criminal conviction.<sup>1</sup> Thus, Judge Porteous's repeated references to what the Department of Justice did or did not do adds nothing to the Senate's evaluation of the charges or the facts in this case.<sup>2</sup>

Further, according to Judge Porteous, pre-Federal bench conduct cannot be the basis of Impeachment, even if that conduct consisted of egregious corrupt activities that was beyond the reach of criminal prosecution because the statute of limitations had run, and even if Judge

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<sup>1</sup>Judge Harry E. Claiborne was acquitted of Article III, charging that he “was found guilty by a twelve-person jury” of criminal violations of the tax code, and that “a judgement of conviction was entered against [him].” See “Impeachment of Harry E. Claiborne,” H. Res. 471, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (Articles of Impeachment); 132 Cong. Rec. S15761 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (acquitting him on Article III).

<sup>2</sup>Moreover, the Department of Justice's investigation hardly vindicated Judge Porteous. To the contrary, the Department viewed Judge Porteous's misconduct as so significant that it referred the matter to the Fifth Circuit for disciplinary review and potential impeachment, and set forth its findings in its referral letter.

Porteous fraudulently concealed that conduct from the Senate and the White House at the time of his nomination and confirmation. There is nothing in the Constitution to support this contention, and it flies in the face of common sense. The Senate is entitled to conclude that Judge Porteous's pre-Federal bench conduct reveals him to have been a corrupt state judge with his hand out under the table to bail bondsmen and lawyers. Such conduct, which, as alleged in Articles I and II, continued into his Federal bench tenure, demonstrates that he is not fit to be a Federal judge.

Finally, the notion that Judge Porteous is entitled to maintain a lifetime position of Federal judge that he obtained by acts that included making materially false statements to the United States Senate is untenable. Judge Porteous would turn the confirmation process into a sporting contest, in which, if he successfully were to conceal his corrupt background prior to the Senate vote and thereby obtain the position of a Federal judge, he is home free and the Senate cannot remove him.

#### ARTICLE I

The House of Representatives denies each and every statement in the Answer to Article I that denies the acts, knowledge, intent or wrongful conduct charged against Respondent.

#### FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation of this purported affirmative defense and further states that Article I sets forth an impeachable offense as defined in the Constitution of the United States.

## SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation of this purported affirmative defense, namely, that Article I is vague. To the contrary, Article I sets forth several precise and narrow factual assertions associated with Judge Porteous's handling of a civil case (the Liljeberg litigation), including allegations that Judge Porteous "denied a motion to recuse himself from the case, despite the fact that he had a corrupt financial relationship with the law firm of Amato & Creely, P.C. which had entered the case to represent Liljeberg" and that while that case was pending, Judge Porteous "solicited and accepted things of value from both Amato and his law partner Creely, including a payment of thousands of dollars in cash." There is no vagueness whatsoever in these allegations. Article I's allegation that Judge Porteous deprived the public and the Court of Appeals of his "honest services" – a phrase to which Judge Porteous raises a particular objection – could not be more clear and free of ambiguity as used in this Article, and accurately describes Judge Porteous's dishonesty in handling a case, including his distortion of the factual record so that his ruling on the recusal motion was not capable of appellate review.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Judge Porteous treats Article I as if it alleges the criminal offense of "honest services fraud," in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1346, and that because the term "honest services" has been challenged as vague in the criminal context, the term is likewise vague as used in Article I. Despite Judge Porteous's suggestion to the contrary, Article I does not allege a violation of the "honest services" statute. Moreover, it could hardly be contended that proof that Judge Porteous acted dishonestly in the performance of his official duties does not go to the very heart of the Senate's determination of whether he is fit to hold office.

## THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation of the purported affirmative defense that Article I charges more than one offense. The plain reading of Article I is that Judge Porteous committed misconduct in his handling of the Liljeberg case by means of a course of conduct involving his financial relationships with the attorneys in that case and his failure to disclose those relationships or take other appropriate judicial action. The separate acts set forth in Article I constitute part of a single unified scheme involving Judge Porteous's dishonesty in handling Liljeberg. Further, the charges in this Article are fully consistent with impeachment precedent.<sup>4</sup>

## FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation of this purported affirmative defense, which, in effect, seeks to suppress the statements of a highly educated and experienced Federal judge, made under oath, before other Federal judges. Judge Porteous was provided a grant of immunity in connection with his Fifth Circuit Hearing testimony, and the

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<sup>4</sup>The respective Articles of Impeachment against Judges Halsted L. Ritter, Harold Louderback, and Robert W. Archbald each set forth lengthy descriptions of judicial misconduct arising from improper financial relationships between those judges and the private parties. These consist of detailed narration specifying numerous discrete acts. See "Impeachment of Judge Halsted L. Ritter," H Res. 422, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 2, 1936) and "Amendments to Articles of Impeachment Against Halsted L. Ritter," H. Res. 471, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 30, 1936), reprinted in "Impeachment, Selected Materials, House Comm. on the Judiciary," Comm. Print (1973) [hereinafter "1973 Committee Print"] at 188-197 (H. Res 422), 198-202 (H. Res. 471); ["Articles of Impeachment against Judge Robert W. Archbald"], H. Res. 622, 62d Cong., 2d Sess (1912), 48 Cong Rec. (House) July 8, 1912 (8705-08), reprinted in 1973 Committee Print at 176; and ["Articles of Impeachment against George W. English,"] Cong Rec. (House), Mar. 25, 1926 (6283-87), reprinted in 1973 Committee Print at 162.



immunity order provided that his testimony from that proceeding could not be used against him in “any criminal case.” Simply put, an impeachment trial is not a criminal case.<sup>5</sup> Accordingly, there is simply no credible basis to argue that the Senate should not consider Judge Porteous’s immunized Fifth Circuit testimony.

#### ANSWER TO ARTICLE II

The House of Representatives denies each and every statement in the Answer to Article II that denies the acts, knowledge, intent or wrongful conduct charged against Respondent.

#### FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation of this purported affirmative defense and further states that Article II sets forth an impeachable offense as defined in the Constitution of the United States.

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<sup>5</sup>The Constitution makes it clear that impeachment was not considered by the Framers to be a criminal proceeding. It provides: “Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.” U.S. Const., Art. 3, cl. 7. See also, United States v. Nixon, 506 U.S. 224, 234 (1993) (“There are two additional reasons why the Judiciary, and the Supreme Court in particular, were not chosen to have any role in impeachments. First, the Framers recognized that most likely there would be two sets of proceedings for individuals who commit impeachable offenses—the impeachment trial and a separate criminal trial. In fact, the Constitution explicitly provides for two separate proceedings. . . . The Framers deliberately separated the two forums to avoid raising the specter of bias and to ensure independent judgments . . .”).

## SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation of this purported affirmative defense, namely, that the Article is vague. To the contrary, Article II sets forth several precise and narrow factual assertions associated with Judge Porteous's relationship with the Marcottes – both prior to and subsequent to Judge Porteous taking the Federal bench. Article II alleges with specificity the things of value given to Judge Porteous over time and identifies the judicial or other acts taken by Judge Porteous for the benefit of the Marcottes and their business.

## THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation of this purported affirmative defense, namely, that the Article improperly charges multiple offenses. The plain reading of Article II is that Judge Porteous engaged in a corrupt course of conduct whereby, over time, he solicited and accepted things of value from the Marcottes, and, in return, he took judicial acts or other acts while a judge to benefit the Marcottes and their business.

## FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation of this purported affirmative defense, namely, that Article II improperly charges pre-Federal bench conduct as a basis for impeachment. First, Article II plainly alleges that Judge Porteous's corrupt relationship with the Marcottes continued while he was a Federal Judge. Second, Judge Porteous's assertion that pre-Federal bench conduct may not form a basis for impeachment finds no support in the

Constitution and is not supported by any other sound legal or logical basis.<sup>6</sup> As a factual matter, it is especially appropriate for the Senate to consider Judge Porteous's pre-Federal bench corrupt relationship with the Marcottes where it was affirmatively concealed from the Senate in the confirmation process, where it involved conduct as a judicial officer directly bearing on whether he was fit to hold a Federal judicial office, and where that conduct, having now been exposed, brings disrepute and scandal to the Federal bench.

### ARTICLE III

The House of Representatives denies each and every statement in the Answer to Article III that denies the acts, knowledge, intent or wrongful conduct charged against Respondent.

### FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation of this purported affirmative defense and further states that Article III sets forth an impeachable offense as defined in the Constitution of the United States.

### SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation of this purported affirmative defense, which alleges in substance that the allegations in Article III are vague. To the contrary, Article III sets forth several specific allegations associated with Judge Porteous's

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<sup>6</sup>As but one example, if the pre-Federal bench conduct consisted of treason, there could be no credible contention that such conduct would not provide a basis for impeachment.



conduct in his bankruptcy proceedings. There is no credible contention that Judge Porteous cannot understand what he is charged with in this Article.

### THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation of this purported affirmative defense, which alleges, in substance, that Article III charges more than one offense. The plain reading of Article III is that Judge Porteous committed misconduct in his bankruptcy proceeding by making a series of false statements and representations, and by incurring new debt in violation of a Federal Bankruptcy Court order. This Article alleges a single unified fraud scheme, with the purpose of deceiving the bankruptcy court and creditors as to his assets and his financial affairs, so that Judge Porteous could enjoy undisclosed wealth and income for personal purposes -- including gambling.

### FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation of this purported affirmative defense, which, in effect, seeks to suppress the statements of a highly educated and experienced Federal judge, made under oath, before other Federal judges. Judge Porteous was provided a grant of immunity in connection with his Fifth Circuit Hearing testimony, effectively eliminating the possibility that any of that testimony could be used against him in any criminal case. An impeachment trial is not a criminal case. There is simply no credible basis to argue that the Senate should not consider Judge Porteous's immunized Fifth Circuit testimony.

## FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation of this purported affirmative defense – which does not take issue with the proposition that Judge Porteous committed misconduct in a Federal judicial bankruptcy proceeding, but contends only that the acts as alleged do not warrant impeachment. First, this is not an affirmative defense. It is up to the Senate to decide whether the facts surrounding the bankruptcy warrant impeachment.

Second, the Senate has in fact removed a judge for personal financial misconduct, and in 1986 convicted Federal Judge Harry Claiborne and removed him from office for evading taxes. It is significant that the Senate did not convict Judge Claiborne for the crime of evading taxes. Rather, the Senate acquitted Judge Claiborne of the one Article that charged him with having committed and having been convicted of a crime.

Third, what the Department of Justice may consider material for purposes of a criminal prosecution has nothing to do with what the Senate may deem to be material for purposes of determining whether Judge Porteous should be removed from Office – an Office which requires that he oversee bankruptcy cases and administer and enforce the oath to tell the truth.<sup>7</sup>

## ARTICLE IV

The House of Representatives denies each and every statement in the Answer to Article IV that denies the acts, knowledge, intent or wrongful conduct charged against Respondent.

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<sup>7</sup>It should be noted that Judge Porteous has testified and cross-examined witnesses at the Fifth Circuit Hearing on the subject of his bankruptcy, and the House therefore possesses evidence that was unavailable to the Department of Justice.

## FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation of this purported affirmative defense and further states that Article IV sets forth an impeachable offense as defined in the Constitution of the United States.

## SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation of this purported affirmative defense, which alleges the Article is vague. The allegations sets forth in Article IV are specific and precise. In fact, Judge Porteous's description of the charge fairly characterizes the offense: "In essence, Article IV alleges that Judge Porteous gave false answers on various forms that were presented in connection with the background investigation . . . ." It is apparent, therefore, that Judge Porteous has a clear understanding of these allegations in Article IV, which specify the dates and circumstances when the statements were made, and the contents of the statements that are alleged to have been false. There is no credible contention that the Article IV does not provide Judge Porteous specific notice as to what this Article alleges.

## THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation of this purported affirmative defense. The allegation sets forth in Article IV are specific and precise. They charge in substance that Judge Porteous made a series of false statements to conceal the fact of his improper and corrupt relationships with the Marcottes and with attorneys Creely and Amato in order to procure the position of United States District Court Judge. Charging these four false

statements, all involving a single issue, in a single Article is consistent with precedent.<sup>\*</sup>

#### FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation of this purported affirmative defense, alleging that the Senate cannot impeach Judge Porteous based on pre-Federal bench conduct. First, Judge Porteous's assertion that pre-Federal bench conduct may not form a basis for impeachment is not supported by the Constitution. Notwithstanding Judge Porteous's assertions to the contrary, the Constitution does not limit Congress from considering pre-Federal bench conduct in deciding whether to impeach, and there are compelling reasons for Congress to consider such conduct – especially where such conduct consists of making materially false statements to the Senate. The logic of Judge Porteous's position is that he cannot be removed by the Senate, even though the false statements he made to the Senate concealed dishonest behavior that goes to the core of his judicial qualifications and fitness to hold the


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<sup>\*</sup>As but one example, Article III of the Articles of Impeachment against Judge Walter Nixon charged that he concealed material facts from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice by making six, specified, false statements on April 18, 1984 at an interview, and by making seven discrete false statements under oath to the Grand Jury. "Impeachment of Walter L. Nixon, Jr.," H. Res. 87, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (Article III).

Office of United States District Court Judge. The proposition that the Senate lacks power under these circumstances to remedy the wrong committed by Judge Porteous is simply untenable.

Respectfully submitted,

THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES



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